In 2023, artisans from the Chanakya School of Craft turned paintings by Manu and Madhavi Parekh into floor-to-ceiling embroidered textiles that were displayed in an exhibition. The original paintings dealt with themes of mythology, femininity, and divinity, which were recontextualised through ancient Indian stitching techniques into new artworks. For Kant, the original paintings would be fine art, capable of involving genius and representing aesthetic ideas. The textiles, however, would be “handicrafts” – their practical, mechanical construction and “remunerative” actualization preclude them from being artworks in the Kantian sense (5:304). In this essay, I uphold Kant’s distinction between aesthetic judgements of taste and aesthetic judgements of the agreeable (D₁), and show that it largely comports with the distinction between ‘fine’ and ‘practical arts’ (D₂).  However, I suggest that D₂ is not as clear as D_1,  and that the changing nature of remunerative creation puts pressure on Kant’s account.

The essay first explains aesthetic judgements of taste and their peculiarity. Next, it contrasts these with the aesthetic judgement of sense which is in play when contemplating “agreeable” art rather than beauty (5:206). Then, it traces if D₁ can be mapped onto D₂. Finally, it engages with the concerns of the evolution of remunerative creation.

Aesthetic Judgements of Taste and Agreeableness

We can say Kant’s characterization of judgements of taste has four components: it does not involve concepts, but pleasure and play; it is subjective; it is disinterested; and it is universal. First, judgements of taste do not comprise an assortment of concepts that are cognitively broken down and understood. They rely on the free play of the imagination, and the pleasure in the task of judging. These involved faculties function in much the same way as they would in the case of encountering concepts, but without the concepts themselves. For instance, moral judgements emerge out of a body of moral laws, the comprehension of which help in deciding whether an act is moral or not. Contrarily, and to the second component, aesthetic judgements of taste have only an individual’s subjective experience to scaffold their verdict about whether an artwork is beautiful or not. A person uses their faculties, for these faculties of the aesthetic experience can lead the person to the correct judgement – there are no concepts nor other agents to fall back on.

At this point, a spectator doing the judging has enjoyed the pleasure of their faculties and imagination to regard the object under contemplation, and may say, “I think this lily is beautiful.” However, this is not in itself constitutive of the aesthetic pleasure of beauty. They must also, thirdly, think that their pleasurable encounter with the lily would be pleasurable universally: “Everyone would find this lily beautiful.” It is important to note that it does not matter whether empirically everybody else would, in fact, find said lily beautiful. Kant is speaking to the claim in the observer to expect or suggest that everybody might share in the observer’s judgement. In this way, it is subjective, yet has requirement of universality. Alongside the individual pleasures of perception, there must be universal assent to the judgement. Finally, and this is the peculiar aspect of judgements, they must be disinterested (5:205).  The pleasure is derived not from the reality or utility of the object, but from its apprehension – it is an end in itself, the experience and contemplation it sets up are irreducible to moving parts, and enduring in their effects. The object has “purposiveness” without really having a “purpose” (5:228). It seems purposive, but remains distinct from morality, perfection, and utility.

Judgements of the agreeable, on the other hand, are based on sensory, visceral pleasures. An example would be a person who said, “I think this lily is good or lovely,” but failed to see in it that universal appeal or disinterested contemplative potential. There is space here for the individual’s preferences to come in, someone else might say, “I do not like lilies. I do not find this lily good.” There are no grounds to generalize judgements of the agreeable, they are the sort of things appreciated in their moment of perception, but quickly forgotten afterwards, inspiring no protracted engagement. Agreeable art is that which has been created or is perceived as only for “enjoyment,” rather than anything deeper (5:305) . [Art] “of this kind are all those charms that can gratify the company at a table, such as telling entertaining stories, getting the company talking in an open and lively manner…in which…much can be chattered about and nobody will be held responsible for what he says, because it is only intended as momentary entertainment, not as some enduring material for later reflection or discussion” (5:305).

‘Fine’ Art and ‘Practical Art’

Fine art, both in Kantian aesthetics and popular discourse is thought of as a result of genius, involving high-level creative faculties producing something that could be transcendental. They are ends in themselves, and beyond some boilerplate basics of colour theory and technique, come to life based on the artists’ vision and capacity. ‘Practical art,’ on the other hand, serves a purpose. It is created for a function – fashion is created to be worn, handicrafts are used directly or as decoration of some kind. The end is not an artwork regarded in museums, but something, as the term would suggest, more ‘practical.’ It is paid work, and usually involves mechanical work or the reproduction of established techniques over and over again to produce the finished product. Where fine art is created through a process rewarding and pleasurable for the artist, practical art is usually created through “burdensome” ‘labour’ that may be frustrating, or, in the Marxist tradition, coerced (5:304).

Mapping the Distinctions

It is true that if aesthetic judgements of taste must be made of objects which do not have purposes, then practical artworks cannot be beautiful, for they serve clear purposes. Apprehending a practical artwork would might lead spectators to appreciate the skill in pulling off a difficult technique, or working with a difficult material, or completing a massive project requiring immense amounts of time and focus – these are concepts. Fine art, on the other hand, veers much further from learned techniques. It quickly becomes about possibilities, expression, and genius – indeed, it contains aesthetic concepts. It is capable of inspiring introspection even after the object is no longer physically present.

The idea of the creative process being vitiated by the imposition of an end – usually economic – is plausible. It would likely change the spectrum of creative exploration an artist permits herself. However, it is difficult to intuitively see why fine art is not beholden to aspects of a burdensome creative process. Art has always had an economy and audiences. In other words, fine art is neither created nor appreciated outside of the constraints of remuneration. Perhaps one can argue that the constraints are not as structurally embedded as they are, in, for instance, the fashion industry or for artisans making decorative objects. The immediate goal for an artist would be to make something beautiful, whereas the practical arts would strive to make something that is commissioned or sellable. In the contemporary context, it can be argued that remuneration and the ‘ends’ of the creation are increasingly obfuscating and prevent aesthetic judgements of taste. People tend to view even fine art with a gaze of understanding its concepts or locating its ‘value.’ Thus, although practical arts are more directly concerned with concepts or ends, even fine art would need an artwork so powerful and beautiful that it forces contemplation without interference. For practical art, no such artwork may exist.

Returning to the Chanakya School’s embroidered textiles, people at the exhibition reported to be more fascinated by the textiles, than their original source material. This may because of the scale of the textiles, or the fine work that would have been involved in creating them. Or, it could be that even practical arts have the ability to inspire contemplation when they represent an artists’ creative genius. This does not mean they lead to pure aesthetic judgements of taste. But it does mean that there is room for the boundaries to change and evolve, as the artistic economy changes its impositions and perspective to art appreciation. 

Works Cited

Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), Paul Guyer (ed.), Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trans), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000

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